In contrast to recent literature, we show that market access requirements (MARs) can be implemented in a procompetitive manner even in the absence of threats in related markets. By focusing on subsidies that are paid only when the requirement is met, we show that a MAR can increase aggregate output relative to free trade provided that the right set of firms is targeted. In the context of a model with multiple Japanese and US firms, we show that a MAR on US imports is procompetitive as long as the US firms are the ones targeted to receive the subsidy.
Introduction
Strongly debated for over a decade, results-oriented trade policies such as export targets or market access requirements (MARs) continue to be viewed with skepticism. Verdier's (1998) recent survey of results-oriented versus rules-oriented policies paints a clear picture as to why. Despite their apparent political popularity and use in Japanese-US trade relations, the academic literature is primarily negative, either showing MARs to be anticompetitive or that, given a choice, the importing country government would prefer a rules-oriented policy because of veri…cation aspects of a MAR. 1 Two exceptions, Krishna and Morgan (1998) and Krishna et al (1997) show that MARs in intermediate goods markets can be procompetitive when related …nal goods markets are considered. Krishna and Morgan (1998) consider an imperfectly competitive model in which the MAR is enforced by the threat of a tari¤ in the …nal goods market, while Krishna et al (1997) consider perfectly competitive markets where a MAR on the intermediate good is shown to lower marginal cost in the …nal goods market.
In this paper, we examine the possibility of procompetitive MARs in the absence of related market e¤ects.
We focus on a MAR in which an importing country, say, Japan, 'voluntarily' agrees to guarantee a certain minimum share of its home market for a …nal good exported from a particular country, say, the US, and we show that such a MAR can increase competition and reduce prices if a properly designed contingent subsidy scheme is used to enforce the requirement. While there are a number of other instruments that could be used (and were by the Japanese authorities in the Semiconductor Agreement), we consider subsidies because they are feasible in a wide range of environments where direct control is not. 2 Additionally, 1 See, for example, , Verdier (1997) , Greaney (1996) , Greaney (1997) , Ethier and Horn (1996) , Cronshaw and Markusen (1995) , Dumler (1996) , Irwin (1994) , among others. 2 As noted by Greaney (1996) , the Japanese government had no legal authority to restrict Japanese sales, so that MITI had to rely on "moral suasion" or the use of …nancial instruments to provide incentives for we focus on the least cost subsidies that enforce the MAR.
Formally, in a one-period Cournot model with multiple Japanese and US …rms, we analyze a subsidy scheme in which each targeted …rm receives a monetary reward proportional to its individual share of the market if the market access requirement is met. 3 Three di¤er-ent targeting schemes are considered: (i) contingent subsidies for US …rms, (ii) contingent subsidies for Japanese …rms, and, (iii) contingent subsidies for both US and Japanese …rms.
In all three scenarios, the Japanese government moves …rst in announcing total expenditure for the subsidy scheme. Using numerical calculations, for di¤erent industry compositions, we pick the least cost policy that enforces the MAR and determine whether or not aggregate output increases relative to free trade. We show that when the number of US …rms is much smaller than the number of Japanese …rms, the least cost subsidy -targeting only the US …rms -is procompetitive. However, when the number of US …rms is much greater than the number of Japanese …rms, the least cost subsidy -targeting only the Japanese …rms -is anticompetitive. When the US and Japanese industries are of similar size, the least cost subsidy -targeting both US and Japanese …rms -is procompetitive if the number of US …rms is no smaller than the number of Japanese …rms, but is anticompetitive otherwise.
The intuition behind our results is best seen in the case of two …rms-one Japanese and one US. A contingent subsidy, o¤ered only to the US …rm in the event the market share target is met, creates an incentive for the US …rm to expand output. Since the payment is made only after market clearing, the Japanese …rm's best response is unchanged. With strategic substitutes and stability, the equilibrium involves higher aggregate output as US …rms to meet the target. 3 In general, it is well understood (see Sen, 1966 ) that share based subsidy schemes are more high powered than speci…c subsidies. The reason is that raising one's own output not only raises one's own share, but has a negative externality on that obtained by others, ceteris paribus. Sen pointed this out in the context of the work points system used in Communist China where workers were awarded work points for their e¤ort and the share of output they obtained was equal to their share of the total work points. In this paper, however, it makes no di¤erence whether the contingent subsidy is share based or speci…c.
output increases and Japanese output decreases less than proportionately. In contrast, if the Japanese …rm is targeted, it will decrease output to avail itself of the subsidy, but the US best response is una¤ected. In equilibrium, US output increases less than proportionately so that total output falls and price rises. In this simple case, procompetitive targeting involves subsidizing only the US …rm. With more …rms or other targeting schemes, the analysis is more complicated, but the basic idea is that with a subsidy targeted to the right set of …rms the MAR can be met in a procompetitive manner.
These results are in stark contrast to other studies that examine MARs in the context of a single market. Consider, for example, which also examines the use of subsidies to enforce market access requirements. Key di¤erences in the two approaches are that in the former study (i) subsidies are triggered, not when the MAR is met (as in this paper), but when the market share constraint is violated and (ii) the government moves last so that the level of the subsidy is determined only after …rms make their strategic choices, i.e., the subsidy is determined after …rms announce their strategic choices but before the market clears. This timing is shown to create powerful incentives for …rms to raise prices in the targeted market. The intuition is that the US …rm has an incentive to trigger a subsidy for itself by raising price and lowering its sales such that the market share target is violated.
On the other hand, the Japanese …rm is strategically motivated to increase its price in order to reduce its market share and prevent the subsidy from being conferred on the US product.
Most other analyses of MARs rely on …nancial penalties to enforce the access requirement. The most straightforward of these is the duopoly model of Greaney (1996) where the Japanese government moves …rst and threatens its domestic …rm with a preannounced harsh …nancial penalty in the event that the market share target is not met. 4 In this case, the Japanese …rm has a strategic incentive to raise price in order to lower its sales and prevent the penalty from being triggered. The strategic behavior of the US …rm is not a¤ected by the penalty threat since the threat is enforced only after the market clears and pro…ts have been earned. However, since the …rms are competing in strategic complements, the US …rm matches its rival's price increases and, in equilibrium, both prices are higher compared to free trade. By adopting the same timing structure as Greaney (1996) , we are able to show that the use of contingent subsidies with proper targeting can, in contrast to the common perception of MARs, be procompetitive.
Model
We consider m Japanese …rms and n US …rms competing in quantities in a speci…c Japanese market. Let Japanese …rm i's output be denoted by x i and let y j represent the output of US …rm j. We devise a subsidy scheme based on individual market shares in each of three scenarios. In the …rst, only US …rms are targeted for the subsidy while in the second, only Japanese …rms are o¤ered the subsidy. Finally, we look at the case where both US and Japanese …rms are given the subsidy incentives.
The structure of the game is as follows. In the …rst stage, the government announces that each targeted …rm will receive part of a given subsidy outlay S equal to its individual share of the market only if the aggregate US market share meets the minimum level speci…ed by the MAR. For instance, when only US …rms are o¤ered a subsidy if the target is met, US …rm j receives
S over and above its ordinary pro…t. The …rms then simultaneously and noncooperatively choose outputs in the second stage after which the market clears and that if the subsidy is triggered by a violation of the market share target, …rms with market power will have an incentive to raise price. Greaney (1997) focuses on VIEs in the context of a model with buyer switching costs and shows an import subsidy used to o¤set these switching costs can enhance competition. There are usually several di¤erent ways of implementing a MAR and the e¤ects of the requirement depend critically on the details of the enforcement mechanism.
the government pays out the pre-announced subsidies only if the market share target is met.
We assume a twice continuously di¤erentiable inverse demand function P (X) that is downward sloping, P 0 (:) < 0, and strictly concave, P 00 (:) < 0, whenever positive. We also assume each …rm has a constant marginal cost of production c: We focus on subgame perfect equilibria.
Subsidy policy with only US …rms targeted
First, we consider a market share subsidy that is o¤ered only to the US …rms.
US …rm's best response
Consider US …rm k's optimal choice. Its pro…t without the subsidy, i.e., its ordinary pro…t
while its pro…t with the market share subsidy is
Clearly, ¼ k (:) lies everywhere above ¼ k (:): It can be veri…ed that ¼ k (:) is concave and, for n¸2; has a maximizer B k (:) that is greater than B k (:), the maximizer of ¼ k (:).
5
Now, consider the constraint that must be met in order for …rm k to receive the subsidy, namely,
5 When n = 1, ¼ k (:) = ¼ k (:) + S and the maximizer of the US …rm's pro…t with subsidy is identical its ordinary pro…t maximizer, i.e., B k (:) = B k (:):
Rearranging, we see that …rm k gets the subsidy only if y k¸® 1¡®
) as the minimum amount that …rm k has to produce to trigger the subsidy, i.e.,
Then, k's overall pro…t function is given by and it is optimal to produce just enough so as to satisfy the market share target and earn a subsidy, i.e., b B k (:) = g k (:) is optimal. Finally, we may have the situation depicted in the third case where the US …rm is best o¤ ignoring the temptation of the subsidy and producing along its ordinary best response, i.e., b B k (:) = B k (:).
The nature of a US …rm's best response can be better grasped by considering the duopoly case (i.e., m = 1; n = 1) as depicted in Figure 2 . B 1 (:) and B 2 (:) are the Japanese and US …rms' ordinary Cournot best responses, respectively, while B 2 (:) depicts the maximizer of the US …rm's pro…t with the subsidy. The market share constraint line OM is shown to lie above and to the left of the free trade point F since the constraint is assumed to be binding under free trade. Then, the US …rm's overall best response is depicted by the bold curve. For small Japanese outputs, the overall best response lies along B 2 (:) until the point H where B 2 (:) intersects the market share line OM . For Japanese outputs greater than this level, the US …rm switches to producing along the market share line. This continues until point I is reached, whereupon, the US …rm's overall best response jumps down to point J on its ordinary best response. Note that for x = J 1 , the US …rm is indi¤erent between producing its Cournot output and between producing the minimum output necessary to earn the subsidy. Further, it can be shown that this jump point J 1 , is increasing in S.
It should be noted that, as indicated in footnote 5, unlike the general case, the US …rm's pro…t with the subsidy simply equals its ordinary pro…t plus a constant S: Thus, for this special case, B 2 (:), the maximizer of the US …rm's pro…t with the subsidy coincides with B 2 (:). However, in general, B 2 (:) always exceeds B 2 (:).
Equilibrium
As long as only US …rms are targeted, the market share subsidy does not a¤ect the Japanese …rms strategically and so they continue to produce along their ordinary Cournot best responses. Now, suppose the government picks the smallest S that supports a pure strategy Nash equilibrium satisfying the market share target. Again, referring to the duopoly case for expositional ease, the minimum S is chosen so as to make E 1 in Figure 2 the Japanese output at which the US …rm is indi¤erent between meeting the constraint (by producing at E) and ignoring it (by producing at G on its Cournot best response). Clearly, such an S yields an equilibrium at E that not only satis…es the market access requirement but also yields an aggregate output greater than that under free trade. Hence, implementing a MAR by targeting only the US …rm is procompetitive in the duopoly case. 6 This result is robust to the number of …rms as well as the composition of …rms. The intuition for the procompetitive outcome is that the market share subsidy gives an incentive to the US …rms to expand their output. This results in a less than proportionate contraction of Japanese output (strategic substitutes) such that aggregate output increases.
Subsidy policy with only Japanese …rms targeted
Suppose the subsidy incentives were o¤ered to only the Japanese …rms.
Japanese …rm's best response
Consider Japanese …rm l's optimal choice. Its ordinary pro…t is
As before, subsidy-ridden pro…t ¼ l (:) lies everywhere above ¼ l (:), is concave, and, for m2
; B l (:) is greater than B l (:).
Now, consider the constraint that must be met in order for Japanese …rm l to receive the subsidy. Firm l gets the subsidy only if
Denote h l (:) as the maximum amount that …rm l can produce and still get the subsidy, i.e.,
Then, for any rival outputs, l's overall pro…t function is given by
Again, we have three cases, as depicted in Figures 3(a) , 3(b) , and 3(c). In the …rst case h l (:)¸B l (:) and clearly b B l (:) = B l (:). In the second case, it produces just enough so as to satisfy the VIE target and earn a subsidy while in the third case, the Japanese …rm is best o¤ ignoring the subsidy and producing along its ordinary best response, i.e., b B l (:) = B l (:).
As before, for expositional ease, consider the Japanese …rm's overall best response in the duopoly case shown in Figure 4 . For small US outputs, the Japanese …rm produces along its Cournot best response B 1 (:) until the point K where it jumps down to producing along the market share line OM . This is optimal up to point N after which the Japanese …rm switches to producing the output B 1 (:) that maximizes its subsidy pro…t 7 . Note that the Japanese …rm is indi¤erent between producing at L and K when the US …rm produces the corresponding output level K 1 .
Equilibrium
In this case, the US …rms' strategic behavior is una¤ected by the subsidy. For the duopoly case shown in Figure 4 , the smallest S that supports a Nash equilibrium satisfying the MAR is the S that makes the Japanese …rm indi¤erent between points T and R when the US …rm produces the corresponding output level T 1 . This subsidy outlay yields an equilibrium at T that is associated with a lower aggregate output and higher price compared to the free trade point F . Hence, implementing a MAR by targeting only the Japanese …rm is anticompetitive in the duopoly case. This result can be shown to be robust to the number of …rms as well as the composition of …rms. Here, the promise of the subsidy provides an incentive for the Japanese …rms to cut back on output. This, in turn, is associated with a less than proportionate increase in the output of US …rms such that aggregate output decreases and price increases.
Subsidy policy with both US and Japanese …rms targeted
Now, we consider the case where both US and Japanese …rms are o¤ered subsidy incentives.
US and Japanese …rms' best responses
In this scenario, US …rm k's pro…t with the market share subsidy is
S and the subsidy pro…t for Japanese …rm l is given by ¼ l (:) =
Though these expressions are di¤erent from those in the previous two sections, the analysis is analogous and the best responses are qualitatively similar. However, the overall best responses for the duopoly case di¤er from the previous two targeting regimes since the best response when the subsidy is earned di¤ers from that when it is not earned so that ¹ B 6 = B. Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the US and Japanese …rm's best responses, respectively, under this policy.
Equilibrium
For the duopoly case, the smallest S that supports a pure strategy Nash equilibrium satisfying the market share target is given by that S for which the two overall best responses just touch each other along the market share line before jumping to their respective Cournot responses. This is shown in Figure 7 where the equilibrium must lie at some point along the segment HN on the market share line. The analysis is similar to that in Krishna and Morgan (1997) and the interested reader is referred to it for more details. While it is impossible to analytically discern how the equilibrium price compares to the free trade price, numerical calculations show that aggregate output increases when the number of US …rms is no less than the number of Japanese …rms. The intuition is that this policy scheme creates strategic incentives for the US …rms to expand output and for the Japanese …rms to reduce output. However, with more US …rms relative to Japanese …rms, the expansion of US out-put outweighs the contraction in Japanese output such that prices fall. Now, we turn to a comparison of the di¤erent policies -the subject of the next section.
Comparison of the subsidy policies
Due to tractability problems, we have to rely on numerical simulations for a comparison of the di¤erent targeting schemes. To this end, we consider an industry comprised of m Japanese …rms and n US …rms under the restriction that m and n are positive integers such that 1 · m · 10; 1 · n · 10: We assume a linear inverse demand P = 10 ¡ (
and zero marginal costs of production. The market access requirement is set at a level 10% greater than the aggregate US market share under free trade. For any given industry con…guration, we compute the subsidy outlay S required to meet the MAR under each of the three subsidy policies, and, pick the policy that entails the least subsidy expenditure.
Then, we examine whether or not the least cost subsidy increases aggregate output relative to free trade. The results of the simulations are presented in Figure 8 and Figure 9 .
We …nd that when there are relatively many US …rms, then subsidizing only Japanese …rms is the cheapest way to implement the policy and, as expected, the policy is anticompetitive as the reductions in Japanese output are less than compensated for by the increases in US output. Why is it cheapest to subsidize the Japanese …rms in this case? Think of the case where there are 10 …rms in total, nine of which are US …rms. In order to raise their market share by 10%, assuming the output of the Japanese …rm is …xed, each of the nine US …rms must increase its output by about .1 units. But the market share can be met by having the Japanese …rm reduce its output by about the same .1 unit! It is likely to be cheaper to in ‡uence the one Japanese …rm than all nine US …rms! When there are relatively many Japanese …rms, then for analogous reasons, subsidizing only US …rms is the cheapest way to implement the policy and, as expected, the policy is procompetitive. When there are relatively similar numbers of US and Japanese …rms, then subsidizing both is the cheapest way to implement the policy. In this case, the numbers advantage outlined above is limited and raising US output a bit as well as reducing Japanese output a bit is more e¤ective than just doing either. Also, as expected, the policy is anticompetitive if there are more Japanese …rms than US ones and procompetitive if there are more US …rms than Japanese.
Conclusion
We show that, contrary to the recent literature, market access requirements can be implemented in a procompetitive manner if they are properly enforced. If the least cost policy is to subsidize only Japanese …rms, then in order to meet the market share target
aggregate Japanese output,
The direct e¤ect of the reduction in Japanese output outweighs the indirect e¤ect of the corresponding increase in aggregate US output causing the subsidy to be anti-competitive. By similar reasoning, if the least cost policy is to subsidize only US …rms aggregate output will increase relative to free trade output and the subsidy will be procompetitive. When the least cost policy is to subsidize both US and Japanese …rms then the subsidy is procompetitive if the number of US …rms is no smaller than the number of Japanese …rms, but is anticompetitive otherwise.
Our contribution, therefore, is to show that MARs can be procompetitive even in the absence of threats in related markets. By focusing on subsidies that are paid only when the market share target is met, we have shown a MAR can increase aggregate output relative to free trade provided that the right set of …rms is targeted. Of course, proper targeting is sensitive to the …rm-composition of the industry, bolstering the point emphasized earlier (see ) that the e¤ects of a MAR depend critically on the way in which it is implemented.
Finally, while our results for more than two …rms are based on numerical calculations and may not generalize, the results for two …rms are robust to di¤erent functional forms or market share targets as long as stability conditions are met. The duopoly results are also robust to the type of competition, i.e., the contingent subsidy can be shown to lower prices of both goods under Bertrand competition in a di¤erentiated products duopoly. . 
Key
Subsidizing the Japanese firms only is the cheapest way to meet the market share target. Subsidizing both Japanese and U.S. firms is the cheapest way to meet the market share target. Subsidizing the U.S. firms only is the cheapest way to meet the market share target. 
Cheapest subsidy (only Japanese firms subsidized) is anticompetitive. Cheapest subsidy (both Japanese and U.S. fims subsidized) is procompetitive. Cheapest subsidy (both Japanese and U.S. firms subsidized) is anticompetitive. Cheapest subsidy (only U.S. firms subsidized) is procompetitve. 
